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CHAPTER I 
. INTRODUCTION 
A central problem in the study of sentence memory is the common 
observation that we are better able to remember the "gist" of senten-
tial material than we are the exact verbal structure of that material 
(e.g., Fillenbaum, 1966; Gomulicki, 1956; Jarvella, 1971; Sachs, 1967). 
Interest in this issue has advanced through several areas of investiga-
tion: a) several theorists have suggested that the effect is due to the 
interpretation of the deep structural relations of sentences; b) numer-
ous other researchers have argued that sentence memory is constructive, 
rather than interpretative, in nature; c) the role of one's present 
cognitive knowledge in this process of sentence memory has been exa-
mined; and d) the importance of the availability of contextual informa-
tion in the use of previously acquired knowledge has been discussed. 
The present paper begins by sketching the development of sentence 
memory through each of these areas of investigation. The general ap-
proach to comprehension and memory deriving from this discussion is 
then applied to the study of problem-solving processes. In the exper-
.iments that are reported in the present study, subjects were given a 
paragraph of English text to read. Each subject was then presented a 
problem concerning the material contained in the paragraph, and was 
asked to solve the problem using supplementary information which was 
1 
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provided. Data from these experiments were used to test several pre-
dictions concerning the effects of various context conditions upon the 
comprehension and storage of sentences, and the subsequent use of this 
information in the solution of an algebra word problem. 
Sentence Memory 
2 
Interpretative Approach. Several attempts to account for sentence 
memory have relied heavily upon concepts developed within transforma-
tional linguistic theory (Chomsky, 1957, 1965, 1968). Prominent among 
these attempts has been the interpretative approach of Postal (Postal, 
1964; Katz & Postal, 1964). This approach is based upon the contention 
that a sentence consists of both a surface structure and a deep struc-
ture. The surface structure characterizes the phonological shape of the 
sentence, while the interpretation of the deep structure comprises the 
cognitive meaning of the sentence. It is assumed that this semantic 
interpretation of the deep structural relations of the sentence is neces-
sary for comprehension, and that this interpretation completely charac-
terizes the information that is stored. There have been a large number 
of studies which seem to support such an interpretative approach to 
sentence retention (e.g., Bever, Lackner, & Kirk, 1969; Blumenthal, 
_1967; Blumenthal & Boakes, 1967; Gough, 1965; Mehler, 1963; Miller, 
1962; Perfetti, 1969; Savin & Perchonock, 1965). However, several other 
researchers (e.g., Barclay, 1973; Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; 
Bransford & Franks, 1971) have presented data and arguments in support 
of a constructive approach to sentence memory. 
Constructive Approach. Proponents of a constructive view of sen-
tence memory contend that the semantic interpretation of the deep struc-
p 
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ture of a sentence fails to provide a sufficient characterization of 
what is stored. They argue that while the interpretation of the deep 
structure of a sentence is likely necessary for the comprehension of 
that sentence to take place, the sentence's cognitive meaning is a 
function of t~e complete semantic descriptions that are constructed, 
and not the particular information specified by the linguistic inputs. 
They view sentences as sources of information that can be used to 
construct semantic descriptions of situations; descriptions which 
frequently contain more information than is represented in the lin-
guistic objects. It is these semantic descriptions that are stored by 
an individual in the process of sentence memory, not the deep structur-
al information underlying the sentence. 
Interpretative vs. Constructive. A detailed consideration of the 
study conducted by Bransford et al. (1972) may serve to clarify the 
interpretative vs. constructive controversy in investigations of sen-
tence memory. In this study, stimulus materials similar to the follow-
ing two sentences were employed: 
(1). "Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam 
beneath them." 
(2). "Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam 
beneath them." 
These two sentences, which differ only in the use of the word "beside" 
or "on", describe situations which have vastly different semantic impli-
cations. Whereas both sentence (1) and sentence (2) state that the fish 
swam beneath the turtles, sentence (2) implies the additional informa-
tion that the fish swam beneath the log. This latter information is not 
4 
explicitly provided by the linguistic objects contained in sentence (2), 
and is therefore not acces~ible simply through an interpretation of the 
deep structural relations of that sentence. This information is acces-
sible, however, if a person uses his general knowledge of the world, 
and actively constructs a semantic description of the situation which 
goes beyond the information represented by the linguistic objects in 
sentence (2). 
, 
Bransford et al. (1972) used sentences similar to sentence (1) and 
sentence (2), presenting them to the subjects with the instructions 
that questions about these sentences would be asked later. Following 
the presentation of these acquisition sentences, the subjects were 
presented a second set of sentences, some of which they had heard pre-
viously in the acquisition list and some of which they had not, and 
they were instructed to state which of these test sentences were 
identical to those presented earlier. It was found that when subjects 
were presented a new test sentence in which only the final pronoun dif-
ferentiated that sentence from, for example, acquisition sentence (1) 
(e.g., "Three turtles rested beside a floating log and a fish swam 
beneath it"), they had no difficulty recognizing that new sentence as 
different from sentence (1). However, when subjects were presented 
the new test sentence, "Three turtles rested on a floating log and a 
fish swam beneath it", they were unable to discriminate this new sen-
tence from sentence (2). In the former example, subjects were able to 
recognize the new sentence as new since it described a situation dif-
ferent from that conveyed by sentence (1) (i.e., the fish swam beneath 
the turtles vs. the fish swam beneath the log, respectively). However, 
p 
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in the latter condition, the new test sentence and sentence (2) pro-
vided information that could be used to construct semantically similar 
situations (e.g., the fish swam beneath the log), which resulted in 
recognition errors. 
These basic findings have been replicated and corroborated under 
varied experimental conditions (Barclay, 1973; Barclay & Reid, 1974; 
Bransford & Franks, 1971, 1972; Cofer, 1973; Flagg, Potts, & Reynolds, 
1975; Franks & Bransford, 1971, 1972; Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 
1973; Katz, 1973; Katz, Atkeson, & Lee, 1974; Potts, 1972; Singer, 1973; 
Singer & Rosenberg, 1973). In these studies it was consistently 
demonstrated that subjects did not store representations of the deep 
structural information of the individ~al acquisition sentences; rather, 
they actively processed the sentential information, constructing 
semantic representations which embodied inferred as well as explicitly 
expressed information. These results suggest that linguistic inputs 
are not simply perceptual objects that may later be recalled or recog-
nized; they are a source of information which a person interprets and 
stores within the context of his present cognitive knowledge. When an 
individual hears a sentence (or a paragraph), he processes that informa-
tion in view of what he knows about the world. It is this synthesis of 
previous knowledge and present input which determines the semantic 
description of that information, and it is this description which 
characterizes what is stored by the individual. As Bransford, Barclay, 
& Franks (1972) stated, words do not carry meaning; "people carry 
meanings, and linguistic inputs merely act as cues which people can 
use to recreate and modify their previous knowledge of the world" 
6 
(p. 207). 
Present Cognitive Knowledge. This contention that semantic repre-
sentations are the result of the constructive interplay of sentential 
information and one's existing cognitive structures has been supported 
by Kintsch and Monk (1972). In this study, subjects were presented 
one of two versions of a paragraph, either a simple version or a com-
plex version. In the simple version of the paragraph, very basic 
syntax was used to generate several simple sentences which clearly and 
logically expressed the underlying propositions of the paragraph. In 
the complex version, on the other hand, while the underlying proposi-
tions of the simple paragraph remained intact, they were in this condi-
tion expressed in one, long, complex sentence which was generated 
through the use of several grammatical and syntactic transformations. 
The following paragraphs illustrate examples of a simple and a complex 
version of the same paragraph. 
Simple: "The council of elders in the land of Syndra meets whenever 
a stranger arrives. If the council meets and if the strang-
er presents the proper gifts to the council, he is not 
molested by the natives. The explorer Portmanteau came 
to Syndra without any valuable gifts." 
Complex: "The arrival of strangers in the land of Syndra, like the 
explorer Portmanteau, who did not bring valuable gifts, 
always resulted in the meeting of the council of elders, 
which insured that the stranger was not molested by the 
natives upon receipt of the proper gifts." 
Half the subjects in each of the simple- and complex-paragraph condi-
7 
tions were allowed an indefinite amount of reading time, while the 
remaining subjects were given only a limited amount of time in which 
to read the paragraph. Once a paragraph had been read by a subject, 
he was asked to answer an inferential question concerning the informa-
tion contained in that paragraph (e.g., "Was Portmanteau molested by 
the natives?"). 
Kintsch and Monk found that if subjects were restricted in the 
amount of reading time allowed, then those subjects in the simple-
paragraph conditions were able to answer the inferential questions more 
accurately than were those subjects in the complex-paragraph conditions. 
If subjects were given an unlimited amount of reading time, however, 
then the accuracy with which the questions were answered was found to 
be unrelated to the original wording of the paragraph. These and 
similar results (see Greeno, 1974; King & Greeno, 1974) indicate that 
grammatical and syntactic variables can affect the ease with which the 
information contained in a paragraph may be assimilated by an individ-
ual. However, as long as sufficient time to process and store the 
information in a paragraph is allowed, then an individual is able to 
construct a representation of that information which is independent of 
these format variables (i.e., he is able to assimilate that information 
into his present cognitive knowledge). As a result, his ability to 
answer inferential questions is unaffected by the grammatical and 
syntactic complexity of the paragraph. Thus, to the extent that an 
individual is able to assimilate sentential information into his exist-
ing cognitive structures, he will be better able to use that informa-
. 
tion in subsequent tasks. 
---
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Availability of Contextual Information. The importance of context-
ual information in the assimilation of linguistic inputs into one's 
previously acquired knowledge structures has been discussed by several 
theorists and researchers (e.g., Blumenthal, 1970; Dooling, 1972; 
Harris, 1974; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Norman, 1973; Olson, 1970). 
Blumenthal, for example, has suggested that contextual information 
acts as a prerequisite for the comprehension and retention of prose 
materials; that is, an individual is capable of relating sentential 
information to his existing cognitive knowledge only to the extent that 
appropriate contextual information is available. Regardless of how 
well a sentence is organized and expressed, the information conveyed 
by that sentence will not be comprehended and remembered unless the 
same contextual "field" is shared to some extent by both the speaker 
and the listener. 
There have been several studies in which the facilitating effects 
of contextual information upon sentence memory have been demonstrated. 
Doll and Lapinsky (1974) and Johnson, Doll, Bransford, and Lapinsky 
(1974) found that when subjects were instructed to learn a series of 
unrelated sentences, each of which was constructed such that its 
.contextual referent was not clearly specified (e.g., "He kicked twice 
but got no change."), those subjects who were provided appropriate 
contexts (e.g., "vending machine") were better able to recall the list 
of sentences than were those subjects who did not receive contextual 
cues. Similar results have been obtained in studies in which the 
availability of contextual information has been manipulated through 
the presentation of prose passages in their proper syntactic order vs. 
p 
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either a random word order (Lachman & Dooling, 1968; Philipchalk, 1972; 
Pompi & Lachman, 1967; Yuille & Paivio, 1969) or a random sentence order 
(Meyers & Boldrick, 1975). It has been consistently demonstrated in 
these studies that those subjects who received the intact presentation 
of a prose passage, which served to maintain and to convey the context 
of the passage, were subsequently more likely to recall or to recognize 
theme-related words than were those subjects who were presented random 
arrangements of the prose passage. 
Dooling and Lachman (1971) have also investigated the effects of 
contextual information upon memory for prose passages. In this study, 
short paragraphs based upon clear and coherent themes were constructed 
such that each of these themes was difficult to grasp without some 
thematic cue. For example, Dooling and Lachman used the following 
paragraph in their study: 
"WITH HOCKED GEMS FINANCING HIM / OUR HERO BRAVELY DEFIED ALL 
SCORNFUL LAUGHTER / THAT TRIED TO PREVENT HIS SCHEME / YOUR EYES 
DECEIVE / HE HAD SAID / AN EGG / NOT A TABLE / CORRECTLY TYPIFIES 
THIS UNEXPLORED PLANET / NOW THREE STURDY SISTERS SOUGHT PROOF / 
FORGING ALONG SOMETIMES THROUGH CALM VASTNESS / YET MORE OFTEN 
. 
OVER TURBULENT PEAKS AND VALLEYS / DAYS BECAME WEEKS / AS MANY 
DOUBTERS SPREAD FEARFUL RUMORS ABOUT THE EDGE / AT LAST / FROM 
NOWHERE / WELCOME WINGED CREATURES APPEARED / SIGNIFYING MOMENTOUS 
SUCCESS" 
Half of the subjects who were presented this passage were also presented 
the following thematic title: "Christopher Columbus Discovering America"; 
the remaining subjects were not given a title for the passage. Despite 
10 
the fact that all the subjects were familiar with the lexical meanings 
of the words and the syntactic structures used in the passage, it was 
found that recall of the paragraph was much better for those subjects 
who were given the appropriate context before reading a passage than it 
was for those subjects who did not receive thematic titles. 
While these results clearly indicate the facilitating effects of 
contextual information upon the recall of prose passages, they fail to 
specify the locus of this effect: did the thematic titles produce more 
efficient storage of the materials at input? or, did they aid in the 
reconstruction of the materials during recall? In an effort to evalu-
ate the relative strengths of these alternatives, Bransford and Johnson 
(1972, 1973) and Dooling and Mullet (1973) used prose passages similar 
to those employed by Dooling and Lachman (1971), and they presented 
subjects with an appropriate thematic title a) before a passage was 
read, b) after a passage was read, or c) not at all. It was found that 
those subjects in the Topic Before condition scored much higher, both 
in terms of comprehension and recall, than did those subjects in the 
Topic After condition. Furthermore, the Topic After subjects performed 
little better than did the Control subjects who were never presented a 
·thematic title. Since the Topic Before subjects had the benefit of 
the title both during storage and during recall, whereas the Topic After 
subjects were only able to use this contextual cue during recall, these 
results support the suggestion that the availability of the appropriate 
context serves as an aid in the storage of stimulus materials. 
An explanation of how this contextual facilitation during storage 
is accomplished has been offered by Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973). 
11 
As we have seen, simply having relevant preexperimental knowledge does 
not guarantee its usefulness for sentence comprehension and memory. 
Potentially meaningful material may be rendered incomprehensible if the 
appropriate prior knowledge of the situation is not activated by some 
contextual cue while the materials are being processed. Bransford and 
Johnson therefore contend that contexts enable an individual to inter-
pret and organize input materials in a manner which is consistent with 
his prior knowledge of the world. They suggest that the extent to which 
a prose passage may be remembered is largely a function of how well an 
individual is able to use his prior knowledge to interpret and store 
the incoming information. They have received support for this sug-
gestion from postexperimental interviews with those subjects in Brans-
ford and Johnson (1972, 1973) who were presented prose passages without 
their accompanying thematic titles. These subjects reported that if 
sufficient cues as to a passage's semantic context were not available, 
then they actively searched for some way to make sense of the passage; 
in other words, they attempted to find or formulate a suitable organi-
zation of personal existing cognitive structures into which the incoming 
information might be integrated. While most of these subjects were able 
.to "make sense of", and therefore to remember, some portion of each 
passage, rarely did an individual manage to locate a context which 
enabled him to remember an entire passage. 
Context can thus be seen to play an important role in the pro-
cessing of information, such that the accuracy with which linguistic 
inputs are comprehended and remembered is largely a function of the 
extent to which they may be integrated into one's cognitive structure, 
p 
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which, in turn, is highly dependent upon the availability of appropri-
ate contextual information. So strong is this influence of context, in 
fact, that Huttenlocher and Weiner (1971) and Trabasso (1973) have 
stated that data from experiments in which contextual factors are 
ignored have, at best, limited applicability. 
Problem Solving 
Memory in Problem Solving. The methodological and theoretical 
perspective provided by the research discussed thusfar offers a frame-
work within which the investigation of problem-solving processes may 
be interpreted. In their discussions of problem-solving behavior, 
numerous researchers and theorists (e.g., Duncan, 1959; Gagne, 1964; 
Greeno, 1973; Hayes, 1965; Neisser, 1967; Posner, 1973) have emphasized 
the importance of memory in problem solving. When an individual comes 
to the problem situation, he brings with him information, capabilities, 
and strategies which he has learned and remembers from previous experi-
ence and training. In the process of solving the problem, the individ-
ual must use those learned conceptions, selectively retrieving from 
his memory those ideas and methods which are relevant to the problem. 
Gagne (1964) has suggested that the mere presence of this relevant 
.information in memory is sufficient for problem solution. It has been 
frequently noted (e.g., Bourne, Ekstrand, & Dominowski, 1971; Cofer, 
1957; Maier, 1970; Maltzman, 1955; Simon & Lea, 1974), however, that 
despite the fact that most problems consist of situations in which the 
essential information and mental capacity necessary for problem solution 
are readily available to the individual, many prob~ems remain unsolved 
for extended (and often indefinite) periods of time. In Duncker's (1945) 
jiP 
candle problem, for example, the subjects are required to attach a 
candle to the wall in such a way that it will burn without dripping 
13 
wax on the floor. In spite of the fact that the subjects are provided 
with the necessary materials (i.e., a candle, a small box, some tacks, 
and some matches) and have the necessary knowledge to obtain the solu-
tion (which consists of attaching the box to the wall with the tacks 
and then placing the lighted candle on the box), the problem is fre-
quently solved only after a hint as to its solution has been given. 
While several researchers (e.g., Bartlett, 1958; Bruner, 1957; Koffka, 
1957; Raaheim, 1971) have suggested that the realization of such problem 
solutions is retarded by the existence of a situational "gap" which 
prevents the transformation of the problem state into the desired goal 
state, explanations of this "gap" have generally been as vague and 
elusive as the term itself (see Berlyne, 1965; Davis, 1966; Neimark & 
Santa, 1975). 
Context and Knowledge Orgainzation in Problem Solving. It is this 
author's contention that the presence of this "gap" in the problem 
situation derives from the learned information brought to the problem 
by the individual. Utilization of such information is dependent not 
.only upon its existence in memory, but also upon its relation to the 
circumstances and conditions of the situation at hand. If the presenta-
tion of a problem situation fails to activate relevant existing cogni-
tive structures within an individual, then the information contained in 
those structures will be unavailable for use in obtaining the solution 
to the problem. To the extent that an individual is provided contexts 
that will enable him to interpret and organize problem materials in a 
F' 
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manner which is consistent with his prior knowledge of the world, he 
will exhibit successful problem-solving behavior. 
Support for this contention has been obtained by Katona (1940). 
In his investigations of learning and problem solving, Katona found 
that learning through understanding aided subsequent problem-solving 
performance much more than did either learning by rule or learning by 
rote. It was suggested that these basic findings, which have been 
corroborated by several researchers (e.g., Forgus & Schwartz, 1957; 
Gagne & Brown, 1961; Haslerud & Meyers, 1958; Hilgard, Edgren, & 
Irvine, 1954; Hilgard, Irvine, & Whipple, 1953), resulted from the 
development of differential information structures by the subjects 
within the different learning conditions. While the understanding 
condition resulted in the learning of "meaningful organization", the 
principle-learning and memorization conditions produced learning of 
"senseless connections". In an attempt to account for this learning 
of "meaningful organization" through understanding, Gagne and Brown 
(1961) suggested that learning with understanding requires an individ-
ual to "reinstate", or actively produce, concepts which can later be 
used to solve new problems. This reinstatement of concepts, which 
.Gagne and Brown pointed out may arouse previously acquired cognitive 
organizations within the individual [for further support of this 
• 
suggestion, see Ausubel (1968) and Piaget (1970)], better enables the 
use of acquired knowledge in novel situations than does rote learning. 
Consistent with this position, Greeno (1972) and his associates 
(Egan & Greeno, 1973; Mayer & Greeno, 1972) found that when subjects 
were taught to use the binomial distribution through the use of a 
,. 
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formula (i.e., rule learning), performance was better on subsequent 
test problems which could be solved by a straightforward use of the 
formula than it was on problems that required an interpretation of the 
formula. Those subjects, however, who were taught to use the binomial 
distribution through instructions which explained the variables in the 
formula in terms of concepts which were part of the subject's general 
understanding of random events (i.e., learning by understanding), 
excelled both on those test problems which required a straightforward 
use of the formula and on those problems requiring an interpretational 
use of the formula. These findings indicate, as was suggested by 
Katona (1940), that learning by understanding and learning by rule 
produce differences not only in the quantity of learning, but also in 
the quality of that learning. As Greeno and his co-workers pointed out, 
learning to use the. binomial distribution through an "understanding" 
of its relevant variables enabled subjects to realize relationships 
between the new material and their present knowledge. This realization 
led to the establishment of new links among existing knowledge struc-
tures and made possible the integration of the new information into 
these cognitive organizations. Learning by rule, however, deemphasized 
. the connections between the new material and the subjects' previous 
knowledge of the world, and prompted subjects to add new components to 
their existing cognitive structures. These new components may have 
been well organized among themselves (a situation which Mayer and Greeno 
termed "internal connectedness"), but such an organization was useful 
only in the solution of problems which required a simple computational 
use of these components. It was only when the new information was 
, 
connected to other elements in an individual's general cognitive 
organization (i.e., "external connectedness") that the person per-
formed well both on those problems requiring a direct application and 
on those requiring an interpretation of the new information. 
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Greeno (1973) has similarly suggested that there are two ways in 
which an individual's knowledge might be organized. The first of 
these, which is comparable to the "internal connectedness" discussed 
above, has been labeled "algorithmic knowledge" by Greeno. This type 
of knowledge organization, which simply consists of an ability to use · 
a relevant set of rules, does not involve an understanding of the 
operation of those rules. The second type of knowledge organization, 
which has been termed "propositional knowledge" {see Kintsch, 1972), 
corresponds to the "external connectedness" discussed by Mayer and 
Greeno. In Propositional knowledge, the information presented is 
contextually linked to the general ideas already in the subject's 
semantic memory; that is, the new information is "embedded" in the 
person's general knowledge of the world. 
In an effort to manipulate the development of these two types of 
knowledge organization within subjects, Greeno (1973), Kieras and 
.Greeno (1975), and Mayer and Greeno (1975) conducted experiments in 
which subjects were required to memorize either a set of conceptually 
meaningful formulas or a set of equivalent formulas which were stated 
in terms of semantically nonmeaningful letters. For example, the 
following equations were used to describe an hypothetical automobile 
trip: 
Driving time = arrival time - leaving time 
, 
Distance = driving time x average speed 
Gas mileage = distance / gas used 
Total time = driving time + preparation time. 
The following equivalent equations using nonmeaningful letters were 
alternatively employed: 
V = F L 
D=VxA 
M = D I G 
T = V + P. 
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In the case of the former equations, the information presented has 
cognitive meaning for the subject; that is, it can be understood in 
relation to the subject's knowledge of traveling time, speed, distance, 
gas consumption, etc. In the case of the nonmeaningful equations, 
however, while strong rigid connections among the variables in the 
formulas are fostered, there are no contextual cues which might enable 
an individual to relate the information provided to his existing 
cognitive knowledge. As a result, one might expect subjects to better 
comprehend and remember the information provided when the meaningful 
equations are presented than when the nonmeaningful formulas are used, 
.which should result in superior problem-solving performance in the 
former situation. Consistent with this expectation, Mayer and Greeno 
(1975) found that subjects who received the meaningful equations per-
formed much better on subsequent problem-solving tasks than did those 
subjects who were presented the nonmeaningful equations. 
Incomplete Information in Problem Solving. Duncker (1945) has 
pointed out that in solving a problem, an individual must consider the 
, 
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behavioral constraints that are imposed upon the problem solution by 
the restricting requirements surrounding the problem situation. As 
this statement suggests, an important element in efficient problem-
solving behavior is the ability to recognize conditions which fail to 
satisfy the restrictions which encompass the problem situation (Mayer 
& Greeno, 1972). Support for this contention has been obtained by 
Paige and Simon (1966). These researchers found that when subjects 
were required to solve an algebra word problem, those subjects who 
reported having constructed a conceptual image of the problem elements, 
thus relating these elements to their knowledge of the world, were 
better able to detect inconsistencies in the task requirements than 
were those subjects who reported that they had attempted to solve the 
problem by means of more mechanical, or algorithmic, manipulations of 
the problem elements. Greeno (1973) similarly reported that those 
subjects who were presented a problem situation which consisted of 
semantically meaningful equations, which resulted in a propositional 
knowledge of the problem elements, were able to detect incomplete and 
inconsistent information in the structure of the problem more easily 
than were those subjects who were presented equivalent nonmeaningful 
.equations describing the problem situation. These results indicate 
that to the extent that an individual is able to restructure and inte-
grate the elements of a problem situation into his existing cognitive 
structure, the better will he be able to detect inconsistencies and 
incomplete information in that problem situation. 
Transformational Use of Information in Problem Solving. Egan and 
Greeno (1973) and Mayer and Greeno (1975) have similarly suggested that 
, 
whether or not an individual is able to relate the elements of the 
problem situation to his knowledge of the world has a strong effect 
upon his ability to handle modifications of the presentation format 
of those elements. As Mayer and Greeno observed, those subjects who 
were presented a problem situation consisting of nonmeaningful equa-
tions retained the presentation ·organization of the problem elements 
much more rigidly than did those subjects who received the meaningful 
equations. These findings indicate that the more an individual is 
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able to organize and integrate the elements of a problem situation into 
his existing knowledge structure, the more flexible will be his use of 
those elements; that is, the better will he be able to transform, or 
reinterpret, those elements. 
The Present Study 
Two experiments were conducted in the present study. In each 
of these experiments subjects were presented a problem situation, a 
statement of the problem to be solved, and a set of items of infor-
mation which were to be used in the solution of that problem. The 
problem used was logically structured, and the information provided 
enabled a solution to be obtained in a logical and straightforward 
.manner; that is, the solution could be obtained through the selection 
of a specific sequence of the informational items. Such an organ-
ized sequence of responses made in an effort to achieve the solution 
to a problem has been termed a "strategy" (Bourne et al. , 1971). 
To the extent that a subject's strategy approximates the logical 
structure of the problem, his strategy may be said to be efficient. 
In the present study, a measure of problem-solving efficiency was 
, 
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obtained through an analysis of the number of items of information 
required by each subject to solve the problem. In addition to this 
Efficiency Score, measures were also taken on the total time to 
solution, the time required for the preparation of a solution strategy, 
the inter-item latencies, and the accuracy of the problem solution 
given by the subject. 
Experiment I. The first experiment conformed to a factorial 
crossing of three treatment variables, with two levels per variable. 
Half the subjects in this experiment recieved a statement of the 
problem situation in which a thematic cue was presented which 
provided an appropriate context for the problem. The remaining 
subjects were presented the same statement of the problem situation, 
except that no contextual information was provided. Each subject 
was then presented a set of items of information which was to be used 
in the solution of the problem. This set of items of information 
was structured in such a way that half the subjects in each of the 
context and no-context conditions was permitted to select either of 
two possible solution strategies in order to solve the problem. 
The specific strategy used by an individual was indicated by the 
· informational items which he selected in the process of solving the 
problem. The remaining subjects in each of the context and 
no-context conditions were presented a restricted set of inf or-
mational items. This set of items of information was structured 
such that these latter subjects were restricted to the use of only 
one of the two solution strategies. Each of these latter subjects 
was presented additional items of information which provided some 
p 
of the information required for the use ·of the solution strategy 
which was not permitted; however, these additional items failed to 
provide all of the information necessary for the use of this alter-
nate strategy. Thus these latter subjects in Experiment I were 
provided "incomplete" information. 
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The wording of the items of information presented to the subjects 
was also manipulated in Experiment I. For half the subjects in each 
of the four categories generated by the factorial crossing of the 
availability of a contextual cue and the number of allowed solution 
strategies, the items of information provided were stated in terms 
of positive sentences; the remainder of the subjects received 
equivalent negative statements. It has been consistently demonstrated 
(e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972; Slobin, 1966; Trabasso, Rollins, 
& Shaughnessy, 1971; Wason, 1961) that due to the transformations, 
or reinterpretations, necessary for the comprehension of negative 
sentences, positive statements require less time for comprehension 
than do equivalent negative sentences. 
Experiment II. The second experiment consisted of a 2 x 3 x 2 
factorial design in which the three treatment variables were completely 
.crossed. Two versions of the statement of the problem situation were 
employed in this experiment. Half of the subjects were presented a 
simple version of the problem situation in which several simple 
sentences were used which clearly explained the problem situation. 
The remaining subjects were presented a complex version of the 
problem situation in which one long, complex sentence was used to 
explain the problem situation. 
, 
The availability of a thematic cue was manipulated in Experi-
ment II such that an equal number of subjects in each of the simple-
and complex-paragraph conditions was provided an appropriate context 
a) before reading the statement of the situation, b) after reading 
the statement of the problem situation, but before attempting to 
solve the problem, or c) not at all. 
The amount of reading time allowed each subject was also manipu-
lated in Experiment II. For half the subjects in each of the six 
conditions resulting from the factorial crossing of paragraph 
complexity and availability of the contextual cue, a single reading 
of the statement of the problem situation was allowed; the remaining 
subjects in each condition were instructed to read the statement of 
the problem situation three times. 
Following the presentation of the statement of the problem 
situation, each subject was provided a set of items of information 
which was to be used in the solution of the problem. The set of 
informational items employed in Experiment II was structured in such 
a way that each subject was allowed to use either of two possible 
solution strategies. 
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Hypotheses. These manipulations of the problem materials were 
brought about to test several hypotheses concerning the use of acquired 
information in the process of solving a problem. 
The findings of Dooling and his associates (Dooling & Lachman, 
1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973) and Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973) 
have indicated that when a subject is provided an appropriate thematic 
cue for a prose passage, he is better able to comprehend and remember 
, 
that passage than when no contextuai cue is provided. Greeno (1973) 
and his co-workers (Kieras & Greeno, 1975; Mayer & Greeno, 1975) have 
similarly manipulated the availability of contextual information in a 
problem-solving paradigm. These researchers have required subjects 
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to memorize either a set of meaningful or a set of nonmeaningful 
equations, and to solve a problem using the information contained in 
those equations. Consistent with the expectation that meaningful 
equations result in superior comprehension and storage of information, 
Mayer and Greeno found that those subjects who received the meaningful 
equations were able to use the information contained in the equations 
more efficiently than were those subjects who were presented the 
nonmeaningful equations. As a result, the former subjects exhibited 
superior problem-solving performance. 
It has been similarly suggested by Bransford and Johnson (1972, 
1973) and by Greeno (1973) that these findings are related to the 
availability of previously acquired cognitive knowledge in the inter-
pretation and storage of the incoming information. If the incoming 
material is semantically meaningful (e.g., appropriate contexts or 
meaningful equations have been provided), then subjects are able to 
·relate this material to their existing knowledge of the world. As a 
result, they will be better able to detect incomplete information 
(Greeno, 1973; Paige & Simon, 1966) and to transform the presentation 
format of the information (Mayer & Greeno, 1975) than will subjects 
who are unable to relate the new information to their present 
cognitive structures. 
The following two hypotheses were therefore proposed: 
, 
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a) When a contextual cue is not provided in the statement of the 
problem situation, then those subjects who are provided complete 
information (i.e., are allowed to use either of the two possible 
solution strategies) exhibit better Efficiency Scores and less 
total time to solution than do those subjects who are presented 
incomplete information (i.e., are allowed to use only one of 
the two solution strategies). When a context is provided in 
the statement of the problem situation, however, then there is 
no difference in the Efficiency Scores and the total time to 
solution of those subjects who are allowed to use either of 
the solution strategies and those subjects who are allowed to 
use only one of the strategies. 
b) When the items of information provided are expressed in terms 
of negative statements, Efficiency Scores and total time to 
solution are poorer than when the informational items are 
expressed in terms of positive sentences. The difference, 
however, between the performance of those subjects who are 
presented the negative statements and those who receive the 
positive sentences is less when a contextual cue is provided in 
the statement of the problem situation than when it is not. 
Kintsch and Monk (1972) obtained data which indicate that if an 
individual is given sufficient time to process the information in a 
prose passage, then the representation of that information in memory 
is independent of the complexity of the original passage. The fol-
lowing hypothesis was therefore proposed: 
c) When subjects are allowed to read the statement of the 
,. 
problem situation only once, then those subjects who are 
presented the complex statement of the problem situation 
exhibit poorer Efficiency Scores and longer total time to 
solution than do those subjects who are given the simple 
version of the problem situation. When subjects are allowed 
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to read the statement of the problem situation three times, 
however, there is no difference in the Efficiency Scores and 
the total time to solution for those subjects given the complex 
version of the problem situation and those given the simple 
statement of the problem situation. 
The availability of contextual information has been shown to be an 
important variable in the comprehension and retention of prose materials. 
Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973) and Dooling and Mullet (1973) have 
obtained data which indicate that contextual information aids recall 
more if it is available at the time of input than if it is provided at 
the time of recall. In fact, subjects who were given the context at 
the time of recall performed little better than did those subjects 
who did not receive any contextual information. The following hypo-
thesis derives from these findings: 
d) Those subjects who are provided the contextual cue before 
reading the statement of the problem situation display better 
Efficiency Scores and less total time to solution than do 
either those subjects who are given the contextual cue after 
reading the statement of the problem situation or those 
subjects who are never provided the appropriate context for 
the problem. 
, 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 161 Loyola University students who ranged in age 
from 18 to 30. Of these subjects, 13 were not able to solve at least 
one of the two practice problems and were therefore excluded from the 
analyses. Four of the remaining subjects successfully solved each of 
the practice problems, but were rejected when they responded on the 
experimental problem by first selecting all of the relevant items of 
information and then deciding which of those informational items were 
needed in order to solve the problem, thus distorting their Efficiency 
Scores as a measure of their problem solving efficiency. Forty-eight 
subjects participated in Experiment I and 96 subjects participated in 
Experiment II. Each subject was tested individually in a session which 
lasted approximately 20 min •• 
Materials 
A deck of 3" X 5" index cards was used to present each problem 
situation. At the top of an accompanying 9" X 11" display board (Figure 
· 1) was the statement of the problem that was to be solved. Beneath the 
problem statement, a set of interrogative probes pertaining to the 
problem situation were displayed. These interrogative probes were 
questions, the answers to which could be used to solve the problem. 
The probes were presented on long narrow inserts which were placed in 
slots in the display board in such a way that the questions were 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
QUESTIONS 
Figure 1. Diagram of the display board. 
ANSWERS 
D 
D 
D 
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D 
D 
D 
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visible through narrow rectangular windows. To the right of each inter-
rogative probe was located its appropriate answer. Each answer was 
placed in such a manner that it was not visible until the insert on 
which its corresponding interrogative probe was presented was pulled 
approximately ~ in. to the right, at which time the answer appeared in 
a small square window in the display board. 
Score sheets were used which allowed the experimenter to record for 
each subject the number of interrogative probes selected, the total time 
needed to obtain the solution to the problem, the time required for the 
formulation of the solution strategy, the inter-probe latencies, and the 
final problem solution that was given. 
The timing device used was a Sodeco impulse counter which register-
ed 10 impulses per sec. from an impulse generator. The desired time 
intervals were printed out by the counter onto a tape. The experimenter 
was able to regulate the counter print-out with a control box interfaced 
with the timing device. 
Procedure 
General. In Experiment I and Experiment II each subject was re-
quired to attempt the solution of three problems. For each of these 
.problems, the problem situation was presented on a series of index cards. 
One sentence (or one phrase) was typed on each card, and subjects were 
paced through the deck at a rate of seven sec. per card. The statement 
of each problem and the interrogative probes pertaining to the problem 
were presented on separate display boards. 
The first two problems presented to each subject were practice 
problems. The first of these (Table 1) was based upon a situation in 
, 
TABLE 1 
PRACTICE PROBLEM I 
Problem Situation 
Card 1: Several students were enrolled in an introductory 
fine arts course at Loyola last semester. 
Card 2: Some of these students were males and some were 
females. 
Card 3: Only two grades were given in the course, either 
pass or fail. 
Problem Statement 
How many males passed the course? 
Interrogative Probes Answers 
How many students were enrolled in the course? 63 
How many tests were given in the course? 3 
How many students passed the course? 49 
How many students failed the course? 14 
How many males were enrolled in the course? 40 
How many times a week did the class meet? 3 
How many females were enrolled in the course? 23 
How many females failed the course? 4 
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which there are two attributes (i.e., sex and achievement of students) 
with two values per attribute (i.e., male-female; pass-fail). The 
second practice problem (Table 2) was similarly constructed from a 
situation consisting of two attributes (i.e., color and objective of 
airplanes) with two values per attribute (i.e., silver or white planes; 
awaiting either take-off or landing instructions). 
If a subject successfully solved each of these initial problems, 
he was asked to solve a third problem which was based upon a situation 
in which there are two attributes (i.e., print and consistency of 
objects) with three and two values per attribute, respectively (i.e., 
solids, patterns, and whites; delicates and durables). The phrasing 
of this problem situation, the number of times that it was presented, 
and the wording and function of the interrogative probes accompanying 
it were manipulated in order to construct the experimental treatment 
conditions in Experiment I and Experiment II. 
Experiment I. Subjects were shown one of two presentations of the 
experimental problem situation. Half of the subjects received a version 
of the problem situation in which thematic information about the problem 
was omitted (Table 3). The remaining subjects were provided the appro-
priate context for the problem. These latter subjects received the 
same problem situation as is presented in Table 3, except that the first 
card was changed to read, "Washing clothes is actually quite simple." 
The statements describing the problem situation were typed individually 
on index cards, and each subject in the context and no-context condi-
tions was presented the appropriate deck of cards three times at a rate 
of seven sec. per card. 
TABLE 2 
PRACTICE PROBLEM II 
Problem Situation 
Card 1: There were several planes awaiting instructions at 
Midway Airport last Monday. 
Card 2: Some of these planes were silver and some were white. 
Card 3: Some of the silver planes were on the ground awaiting 
take-off instructions and some were in the air 
awaiting landing instructions. 
Card 4: Some of the white planes were on the ground awaiting 
take-off instructions and some were in the air 
awaiting landing instructions. 
Problem Statement 
How many white planes were on the ground awaiting take-off 
instructions? 
Interrogative Probes 
How many planes were there altogether awaiting 
instructions? 
How many non-silver planes were not on the ground 
awaiting take-off instructions? 
How many silver planes were on the ground awaiting 
take-off instructions? 
How many non-white planes were awaiting instructions? 
How many people were waiting to board a plane at the 
airport? 
How many silver planes were in the air awaiting 
landing instructions? 
Were weather conditions poor that day? 
How many planes awaiting instructions were not on the 
ground awaiting take-off instructions? 
Answers 
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10 
14 
987 
4 
Yes 
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TABLE 3 
EXPERIMENTAL PROBLEM SITUATION 
WITHOUT THE CONTEXTUAL CUE 
Card 1: The procedure is actually quite simple. 
Card 2: You may have to go somewhere else if the proper 
facilities are not available. 
Card 3: Otherwise, you are ready to begin. 
Card 4: Once the facilities are available, you arrange objects 
into different groups depending upon their 
makeup. 
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Card 5: You could arrange them into solids, patterns, and whites. 
Card 6: One grouping might be sufficient, though, depending 
on how much must be done. 
Card 7: But it is important not to overdo things. 
Card 8: That is, it is better to try too few objects at 
once than too many. 
Card 9: Therefore you might want to further divide the objects 
into delicate and durable groupings. 
Card 10: At first the whole procedure will seem complicated. 
Card 11: But soon it will become just another fact of life. 
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After reading the description of the problem situation three times, 
the deck of index cards was taken from the subject and he was given the 
problem display board. At the top of this display board was presented 
the following instructions: "The objects~ placed in the groups that 
were just described. Using the information below, determine: How many 
objects were there altogether?" Below these instructions on the display 
board were presented interrogative probes which could be used to solve 
the problem. The wording of these interrogative probes was manipulated 
such that half the subjects in each of the context and the no-context 
conditions were presented interrogative probes which were stated in 
terms of positive sentences. The positively-worded interrogative probes 
which were used are listed in Table 4. The remaining subjects received 
interrogative probes of equivalent meaning, but these probes were pre-
sented in terms of negative sentences (Table 5). 
Eight interrogative probes were presented to each subject. Three 
distinct sets of eight interrogative probes were used. The collective 
properties of the interrogative probes in each of these three sets 
constituted the functional manipulation of the solution availability. 
The uniqueness of these sets evolved from the fact that different types 
· of strategies and numbers of solutions were allowed by the interrogative 
probes in each set. One of the sets allowed the use of either of two 
solution strategies (i.e., "complete" information was provided), while 
each of the remaining two sets allowed the use of only one of the two 
strategies (i.e., "incomplete" information was 
there are two possible solution strategies 
"A" through "G" from Table 4 or Table 5 accompany tll 
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TABLE 4 
LIST OF POSSIBLE INTERROGATIVE 
PROBES: POSITIVE WORDING 
Interrogative Probes Answers 
A How many delicate objects were placed in the 13 
solid group? 
B How many delicate objects were placed in the 
white group? 9 
c How many durable objects were there? 50 
D How many delicate objects were placed in the 
patterned group? 17 
E How many durable objects were placed in the 15 patterned group? 
F How many objects were placed in the solid 36 groups? 
G How many objects were placed in the white 21 groups? 
H How many groups of objects were there? 6 
I How long did it take to place the objects 
into the groups? 15 min. 
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TABLE 5 
LIST OF POSSIBLE INTERROGATIVE 
PROBES: NEGATIVE WORDING 
Interrogative Probes Answers 
A How many non-durable objects were not placed 
in the patterned group not the 13 
white group? 
B How many non-durable objects were not placed 
in the solid group nor the 9 
patterned group? 
c How many non-delicate objects were there? 50 
D How many non-durable objects were not placed 
in the solid group nor the white 17 
group? 
E How many non-delicate objects were not placed 
in the solid group nor the white 15 
group? 
F How many objects were not placed in the pat- 36 terned group nor the white group? 
G How many objects were not placed in the solid 21 group nor the patterned group? 
H How many groups of objects were there? 6 
I How long did it take to place the objects 
into the groups? 15 min. 
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on the display board: 
a) The subject may first find out how many durable objects there 
were ("C"). Once this information has been obtained, the subject 
only has to find out how many delicate objects there were in 
order to solve the problem. This value may be determined by 
adding together the number of delicate objects in the solid 
group ("A"), delicate objects in the white group ("B"), and 
delicate objects in the patterned group ("D"). By then adding 
the number of durable objects and the number of delicate objects 
the subject may determine the total number of objects. 
b) By adding the number of delicate objects in the patterned group 
("D") and the number of durable objects in the patterned group 
("E"), the subject may determine the number of objects in the 
patterned groups. This value may then be added to the number of 
objects in the solid groups ("F") and the number of objects in 
the white groups ("G") in order to determine the total number 
of objects. 
However, if the probe "A" in the present illustration is replaced by 
probe "H", it is no longer possible to determine the number of delicate 
objects in the solid group. As a result, the use of the first of the two 
solution strategies listed above is nullified. Similarly, if probe "H" 
replaces probe "E", the use of the second solution strategy is prohibit-
ed, since the number of durable objects in the patterned group is no 
longer attainable. (Probe "I" is a filler probe which is not relevant 
to the solution of the problem. It was randomly presented with the 
other interrogative probes, thus filling out each set so that eight 
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probes were presented to each subject.) 
Half the subjects in each of the context-positive wording, context-
negative wording, no-context-positive wording, and no-context-negative 
wording conditions discussed above were provided interrogative probes 
which were complete (i.e., they were presented probes "A" through "G", 
which allowed the use of either of the two solution strategies). The 
remaining subjects in each condition were presented interrogative 
probes which were incomplete (i.e., they allowed the use of only one of 
the two solution strategies. Half of these latter subjects received 
probes "B" through "H", while the remaining subjects received probes 
"A" through "D" and "F" through "H". 
Six randomly assigned subjects participated in each of the eight 
treatment conditions which resulted from the manipulation of the inde-
pendent variables. These variables, along with the resultant eight 
treatment conditions, are presented in Table 6. 
Experiment II. One of two versions of the experimental problem 
situation was presented to each subject. Half of the subjects received 
a simple version of the problem situation. This simple version was the 
same as that seen by the subjects in Experiment I (Table 3). The re-
maining subjects were presented a complex version (Table 7), which was 
constructed through the use of numerous grammatical and syntactic trans-
formations of the simple version, and it described the problem situation 
in one long sentence. Care was taken to use semantically equivalent 
expressions in the two versions of the problem situation whenever 
possible, and the two versions were equated for number of words used. 
One third of the subjects in each of the simple and complex 
TABLE 6 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTANT 
EIGHT TREATMENT CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT I . 
~ 
Availability of Wording of the Completeness of the 
the Context Interrogative Probes Interrogative Probes 
Complete (T) 
Positive (P) 
Incomplete (I) 
Context (C) 
Complete (T) 
Negative (N) 
. Incomplete (I) 
Complete (I) 
Positive (P) 
Incomplete (I) 
No Context (X) 
Complete (T) 
Negative (N) 
Incomplete (I) 
Condition 
C P T 
C P I 
C N T 
C N I 
X P T 
X P I 
X NT 
X N I 
VJ 
00 
TABLE 7 
COMPLEX VERSION OF EXPERIMENTAL 
PROBLEM SITUATION 
Card 1: The procedure is actually quite simple 
Card 2: once the proper facilities are available, 
Card 3: although you may have to go somewhere else if the 
necessary facilities are not available, 
Card 4: when you begin by arranging objects into different 
groups depending upon their makeup, 
Card 5: possibly arranging them into solids, patterns, and 
whites; 
Card 6: but since it is important not to overdo things, 
Card 7: while one grouping might be sufficient depending 
on how much must be done, 
Card 8: it is better to try too few objects at once than 
too many, 
Card 9: which may mean that you will want to further divide 
the objects into delicate and durable 
groupings, 
Card 10: which may make the whole procedure seem complicated, 
Card 11: but soon it will become just another fact of life. 
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conditions was verbally provided the appropriate context by the experi-
menter before reading the statement of the problem situation. Another 
third of the subjects in each of the simple and complex conditions was 
presented the contextual cue by the experimenter after the statement of 
the problem situation had been read, but before the problem to be solved 
was received. For the remainder of the subjects, no contextual infor-
mation was provided. 
Each statement in the simple and complex versions of the problem 
situation was typed on a separate index card, and each card was present-
ed for seven sec. For half the subjects in each of the six categories 
generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity and avail-
ability or contextual cue, the deck of cards describing the experimental 
problem situation was presented only once. The remaining subjects were 
paced through the deck of cards three times. 
After the subject was allowed either one or three readings of the 
experimental problem situation, the deck of index cards was collected by 
the experimenter, and the subject was given the problem display board. 
The instructions at the top of this display board were the same as 
those employed in Experiment I. Below these instructions on the display 
board were presented interrogative probes that were to be used in the 
solution of the problem. The collective properties of the interrogative 
probes employed in Experiment II were such that each subject was 
allowed the use of either of the two possible solution strategies. 
Eight randomly assigned subjects participated in each of the 
resultant 12 treatment conditions. The interrelationships of the 
independent variables and the 12 treatment conditions are presented 
in Table 8. 
Scoring 
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Each subject was free to choose the number and the order of the 
interrogative probes he wished to have answered in solving the problem, 
but he was cautioned in the instructions to make his probe selections 
carefully. (The instructions, as they were tape recorded and played 
for each subject are presented in Appendix I.) Thus the experimenter 
was able to observe directly the strategy employed by each subject as 
it was demonstrated by the sequence of interrogative probes chosen to 
be answered. (It is, of course, a necessary assumption here that the 
strategy displayed by a subject on any given problem does indeed reflect 
his implicit search, evaluation, and subsequent utilization of the 
available information.) It has been assumed that an ideal strategy for 
the solution of the problem does exist, and that this ideal strategy is 
that selection of probes which accumulates the information needed to 
solve the problem in the most parsimonious manner, i.e., without the 
selection of interrogative probes which provide irrelevant, redundant, 
or otherwi.se unusable information. To the extent that a subject's 
solution strategy approaches this ideal strategy, the number of probes 
selected will decrease, with a minimum of four interrogative probes for 
problem solution. The number of interrogative probes selected by each 
subject was interpreted as his Efficiency Score. 
In addition to this Efficiency Score, measures of problem-solving 
performance were obtained by observing for each subject the total time 
needed to obtain the solution to the problem, the time required for the 
preparation of the solution strategy (i.e., the time which elapsed 
TABLE 8 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTANT 12 TREATMENT CONDITIONS 
Complexity of the Presentation of the Number of Readings 
Problem Situation Context in the of the Problem Situation Condition 
Problem Situation 
One (0) S B 0 
Before (B) 
Three (T) S B T 
One (0) SA 0 
Simple (S) After (A) 
Three (T) S A T 
One (0) S N 0 
Not At All (N) 
Three (T) S N T 
One (0) C B 0 
Before (B) 
Three (T) C B T 
One (0) C A 0 
Complex (C) After (A) 
Three (T) C A T 
One (0) C N 0 
Not At All (N) 
Three (T) r. N 'T' .;:.. 
N 
between the presentation of the display board and the first probe 
selection), the inter-probe latencies (i.e., the time which elapsed 
between probe selections), and the accuracy of the problem solution 
that was offered. lhe subjects were not told that they were being 
timed. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Experiment I 
A 23 ANOVA was computed on the total time data. The results of 
this analysis are summarized in Table 9. The F-ratios for the context 
by wording and context by completeness interactions are less than unity, 
thus not supporting the first two hypotheses stated above. Significance 
was obtained for the main effects of context, wording, and completeness. 
The mean and median total times to solution for each group involved in 
these main effects are presented in Table 10. Those subjects who were 
given a context in the statement of the problem situation required less 
time to solve the problem than did those subjects who were not presented 
a context. The positive wording of the interrogative probes resulted in 
less total time to solution than did the negative wording of the probes. 
Those subjects who received interrogative probes which provided incom-
plete information (i.e., allowed the use of only one of the two possi-
ble solution strategies) required more time to solve the problem than 
did those subjects who were provided complete information (i.e., allowed 
the use of either of the two possible solution strategies). These find-
ings are consistent with preexperimental expectations. 
Summarized in Table 11 are the results of a 2 3 ANOVA computed on 
the Efficiency Score data. The main effects of context, wording, and 
completeness, as well as the second order interaction of these three 
variables, are significant. The context by wording by completeness 
44 
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TABLE 9 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TOTAL 
. ' 
. TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT I 
Source of.Variance SS df MS F 
Context (X) 457078.8 1 457078.8 6. 77 * 
Wording (W) 1307852.0 1 1307852.0 19.38 **** 
Completeness (C) 467208.2 1 467208.2 6.92 * 
x by w 7874.0 1 7874.0 
x by c 164476.1 1 164476.1 2.44 
w by c 5293.8 1 5293.8 
x by w by c 98729. 9 1 98729. 9 1.46 
Error 2698715.0 40 67467.9 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
Condition 
Context 
No Context 
Positive 
Negative 
Incomplete 
Complete 
TABLE 10 
MEAN AND MEDIAN TOTAL TIME TO 
SOLUTION: EXPERIMENT I 
Mean Median 
332.04 221.35 
527.21 541.80 
264.56 195.15 
594.69 619.35 
528.29 502.20 
330.97 217.90 
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SD 
262.34 
371. 09 
203.59 
357.89 
360.10 
276.43 
47 
TABLE 11 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFICIENCY 
SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT I 
Source of Variance SS df MS F 
Context (X) 5.33 1 5.33 4.64 * 
Wording (W) 5.33 1 5.33 4.64 * 
Completeness (C) 27.00 1 27.00 23.48 **** 
x by w 0.33 1 0.33 
x by c 0.33 1 0.33 
w by c 1.33 1 1.33 1.16 
x by w by c 5.33 1 5.33 4.64 * 
Error 45.99 40 1.15 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
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interaction is illustrated in Figure 2. The results of tests for simple 
interaction effects and simple simple main effects (Kirk, 1968, pp. 222-
224) in this interaction are summarized in Table 12. The results of 
these tests indicate that the context by wording by completeness inter-
action is primarily due to differences in the completeness variable 
when no context and positive wording are presented. Subjects who were 
provided incomplete information without a context and with positive 
wording required more interrogative probes in order to solve the problem 
than did those subjects who were given no context and positive wording, 
but who were provided information which was complete. 
Inspection of subjects' inter-probe latencies has suggested that 
much of this context by wording by completeness interaction in the 
Efficiency Score data was a function of random factors operating in 
subjects' initial probe selections. The probe-selection protocols for 
most subjects indicated large latencies between probe selections. This 
was true even for the majority of those subjects who solved the problem 
with the minimum of four probe selections. These large inter-probe 
latencies suggest that few subjects covertly executed a solution strat-
egy to completion prior to the initial probe selection. As a result, 
if a subject was presented a set of interrogative probes in which only 
one of the two solution strategies was possible, his subsequent perfor-
mance was largely dependent upon his initial probe selection. If the 
strategy for which complete information was available was initially 
attempted by a subject, then he needed fewer interrogative probes in 
order to solve the problem. However, if a subject's initial attempt 
to solve the problem used the strategy for which the information 
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Figure 2. Context by wording by completeness interaction for 
the Efficiency Score data: Experiment I. 
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TABLE 12 
SIMPLE SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS AND SIMPLE INTERACTION EFFECTS 
IN THE CONTEXT BY WORDING BY COMPLETENESS INTERACTION 
FOR THE EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT 
Source of Variance SS df MS F 
Context (X) 5.33 1 5.33 4.64 * 
x at wc11 8.34 1 8.34 7.25 * 
x at wcl2 o.oo 1 0.00 
x at wc 21 o.oo 1 0.00 
x at wc 22 3.00 1 3.00 2.61 
Wording (W) 5.33 1 5.33 4.64 * 
w at xc11 4.09 1 4.09 3.56 
w at xc12 0.75 1 0.75 
w at xc 21 0.75 1 0.75 
w at xc22 6.75 1 6.75 5.87 * 
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Completeness (C) 27.00 1 27.00 23.48 **** 
c at xw11 3.00 1 3.00 2.61 
c at xw12 8.34 1 8.34 7.25 * 
c at xw21 21.34 1 21.34 18.56 **** 
c at xw22 1.34 1 1.34 1.17 
TABLE 12 (CONTINUED) 
SIMPLE SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS AND SIMPLE INTERACTION EFFECTS 
IN THE CONTEXT BY WORDING BY COMPLETENESS INTERACTION 
FOR THE EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT I 
Source of Variance SS 
XW at cl 4.16 
XW at c2 1.50 
xc at wl 4.18 
xc at w2 1.50 
WC at x1 0.50 
WC at x2 5.66 
Error 45.99 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
x1 = Context 
x2 = No Context 
W1 = Positive Wording 
w2 = Negative Wording 
c1 = Incomplete Information 
c2 = Complete Information 
df 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
40 
MS 
4.16 
1.50 
4.18 
1.50 
0.50 
5.66 
1.15 
F 
3.62 
1.30 
3.63 
1.30 
4.20 * 
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provided was incomplete, he was subsequently forced to select more than 
the minimum number of probes needed for problem solution, thus raising 
the value of his Efficiency Score. Further support for this suggestion 
that the initial probe choices are the result of random selections rath-
er than the careful consideration of the available information derives 
from the fact that of the 24 subjects in Experiment I who were provided 
complete information, 11 subjects initially selected probes which could 
be used in one of the strategies, while the remaining 13 subjects ini-
tially selected probes which could be used in the other solution strate-
gy. By chance, one would expect 12 subjects to initially select probes 
from each of the possible solution strategies. Pearson's X2 test for 
goodness of fit supported the suggestion of randomness in these findings 
[X2 (1) = 0.083, p>.80). Furthermore, if the initial probe selections 
are random, then for those subjects who were provided incomplete infor-
mation, one would expect the number of subjects initially selecting 
probes which could be used in the permissible strategy to equal the 
number of subjects initially selecting probes from the non-permissible 
strategy. Consistent with this conjecture, Pearson's x2 test of asso-
ciation indicated randomness in the initial probe selections [X2 (1) = 
. 0.166, p>.60). These findings, along with the fact that the majority 
of the subjects (40 out of 48) continued in the solution strategy from 
which the initial probes were selected, further confirm the assertion 
that the Efficiency Scores of those subjects who were provided incom-
plete information were largely determined by random factors operating 
in the initial probe selections. As a result, further analyses of the 
data from Experiment I have been disregarded. 
r 
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Pearson x2 tests of association were planned to evaluate the 
effect of the context, wording, and completeness variables upon the 
solution accuracy data. However, the solution rates approached unity 
(i.e., only eight subjects failed to solve the problem), which resulted 
in expected frequencies too small for legitimate tests. 
Experiment II 
A 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was done on the total time data, the results of 
which are summarized in Table 13. The predicted main effect of context 
is not significant. However, the main effects of paragraph complexity 
and reading time, and the interaction of these two variables, are signif-
icant. The complexity by reading time interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Tests for simple main effects, the results of which are 
summarized in Table 14, indicate that this interaction is primarily 
due to the total time to solution required by those subjects in the 
complex paragraph-one reading condition. These subjects required sig-
nificantly more total time in order to solve the problem than did the 
subjects in the other three conditions. Performance in these latter 
three conditions did not differ in themean total time to solution. 
The results of a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA which was computed on the Effi-
ciency Score data are summarized in Table 15. While the predicted main 
effect of context is not significant, the main effect of reading time 
and the interaction of paragraph complexity by reading time are signif-
icant. The complexity by reading time interaction is represented in 
Figure 4. The results of tests for simple main effects (Table 16) in-
dicate that this inte.raction is mainly due to the number of probe 
selections required for solution by those subjects in the complex para-
TABLE 13 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TOTAL 
TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance SS df MS 
Complexity (C) 47926.44 1 47926.44 
Reading Time (R) 145984.60 1 145984.60 
Context (X) 1114.43 2 557.21 
C by R 120911.50 1 120911.50 
c by x 2251. 67 2 1125.83 
R by X 30256.76 2 15128.38 
C by R by X 6687.89 2 3343.94 
Error 691903.90 84 8236.95 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
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F 
5.82 * 
17. 72 **** 
14.68 **** 
1.84 
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Figure 3. Paragraph complexity by reading time interaction for 
the total time data: Experiment II. 
TABLE 14 
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE COMPLEXITY BY 
READING TIME INTERACTION FOR THE TOTAL 
TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance 
Complexity (C) 
C at R1 
C at R2 
Reading Time (R) 
Error 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
Cl = Simple Paragraph 
c2 = Complex Paragraph 
R1 = One Reading 
R2 = Three Readings 
SS 
47926.44 
160554.59 
8300.28 
145984.60 
589.68 
266340.48 
691903.90 
df MS 
1 47926.44 
1 160554.59 
1 8300.28 
1 145984.60 
1 589.68 
1 266340.48 
84 8236.95 
56 
F 
5.82 * 
19.49 **** 
1.01 
17.72 **** 
32.34 **** 
r 
TABLE 15 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFICIENCY 
SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance SS df MS 
Complexity (C) 1.26 1 1.26 
Reading Time (R) 4.59 1 4.59 
Context (X) 2.27 1 1.14 
C by R 17.51 1 17.51 
c by x 1.89 2 0.95 
R by X 6.06 2 3.03 
C by R by X 4.02 2 2.01 
Error 89.62 84 1.07 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
57 
F 
1.18 
4.31 * 
1.06 
16.41 **** 
2.84 
1.88 
r 
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Figure 4. Paragraph complexity by reading time interaction for 
the Efficiency Score data: Experiment II. 
TABLE 16 
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE COMPLEXITY BY 
READING TIME INTERACTION FOR THE 
EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance 
Complexity (C) 
C at R1 
C at R2 
Reading Time (R) 
R at c1 
R at c2 
Error 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
c1 = Simple Paragraph 
c2 = Complex Paragraph 
R1 = One Reading 
R2 = Three Readings 
SS 
1.26 
14.25 
4. 76 
4.59 
2.12 
20.28 
89.62 
df MS 
1 1.26 
1 14.25 
1 4.76 
1 4.59 
1 2.12 
1 20.28 
84 1.07 
59 
F 
1.18 
13.32 **** 
4.46 * 
4.31 * 
1.99 
19.01 **** 
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graph-one reading condition. These subjects required significantly more 
probe selections than did the remaining subjects. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation between the Efficiency Scores 
and the total time to solution yielded a correlation coefficient of 0.73 
[.!_(94) = 10.36, p<.001]. This highly significant correlation indicates 
that as the number of probe selections required for solution increases, 
the time needed to solve the problem also increases, thus suggesting 
that the Efficiency Score and total time measures of problem-solving 
efficiency are covarying. In an effort to eliminate this covariation 
from the analyses, a 2 x 2 x 3 analysis of covariance (ANACOVA) was 
computed treating total time as the variate and the Efficiency Scores 
as the covariate. In this way, the effect of the experimental manipu-
lations upon total time was measured independent of the concomitant 
variation of the Efficiency Score measure. The results of this 
ANACOVA are summarized in Table 17. Significance was obtained for 
the main effects of paragraph complexity and reading time. Those sub-
jects who were presented the simple paragraph describing the problem 
situation required a mean adjusted total time to solution of 2.64 min., 
while the subjects who were presented the complex paragraph required 
a mean adjusted total time of 3.17 min. The mean adjusted total time 
taken by subjects in the one reading and three reading conditions were 
3.34 min. and 2.47 min., respectively. The highly significant para-
graph complexity by reading time interaction obtained in the ANOVA on 
the total time data, however, was not found in the present ANACOVA. 
The mean adjusted total time required by those subjects in each of the 
conditions generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity 
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TABLE 17 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE TREATING TOTAL TIME AS VARIATE 
AND EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATE: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance SS df MS F 
Complexity (C) 23208.69 1 23208.69 4.98 * 
Reading Time (R) 62835.00 1 62835.00 13.49 **** 
Context (X) 4567.50 2 2283.75 
C by R 8969 .50 1 8969.50 1.93 
c by x 1166.13 2 583.06 
R by X 6216.38 2 3108.19 
C by R by X 1372.44 2 686.22 
Covariate 305172.56 1 305172.56 65.50 
Error 386730.94 83 4659.41 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
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and reading time is illustrated in Figure 5. A comparison of the con-
tents of this figure with the illustration presented in Figure 3 
demonstrates the survival of themain effects of paragraph complexity 
and reading time, and the deterioration of the interaction of these 
two variables. A similar ANACOVA was computed treating the Efficiency 
Scores as the variate and total time as the covariate. No significant 
effects were obtained from this analysis. 
Supplementary analyses were done on the proportions of the total 
time spent in preparation, i.e., the proportion of the total time which 
elapsed between the presentation of the display board and the first 
probe selection. A Pearson product-moment correlation between these 
proportions and total time yielded a highly significant correlation 
coefficient [.!:_ = -0.54, !_(94) = 6.22, p<.001), as did a correlation 
between these proportions and the Efficiency Scores [.!:_ = -0.62, !_(94) 
-7.66, p<.001). These analyses indicate that as the proportion of the 
total time spent in preparation increased, the total time and Efficiency 
Score values decreased (i.e., as the proportion of the total time spent 
in preparation increased, problem-solving performance improved). The 
proportions of the total time spent in preparation were further analyzed 
by correlating these values with the total time residuals resulting from 
the regression of total time on the Efficiency Scores. In this way, the 
correlation between the proportion of the total time spent in prepara-
tion and total time, statistically independent of the effects of the 
Efficiency Score measure, was evaluated. This correlation coefficient 
was found to be significant [.!:_ = -0.12, !_(94) = -1.18, p>.25). 
An ANACOVA was computed treating the proportions of the total time 
63 
Figure 5. Mean adjusted total time for subjects in the conditions 
generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity and reading 
time: Experiment II. 
r 
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spent in preparation as the variate and treating total time and the 
Efficiency Scores as covariates. khe results of this ANACOVA are 
summarized in Table 18. The main effect of reading time and the inter-
action effect of reading time by context are significant. The reading 
time by context interaction is represented in Figure 6. The results 
of tests for simple main effects in this interaction are summarized in 
Table 19. Performance was equivalent in all conditions except when 
subjects were presented the contextual cue f ollwoing three readings of 
the problem situation. These subjects spent a greater proportion of 
the total time in preparation than did the remaining subjects. 
Pearson X2 tests of association were planned in order to evaluate 
the effects of the experimental manipulations upon the solution accu-
racy data. Each of the 96 subjects correctly solved the problem, 
however, which prevented the legitimate use of this statistical tech-
nique. 
TABLE 18 
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE TREATiNG PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
TIME IN PREPARATION AS VARIATE WITH TOTAL TIME AND 
EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATES: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance SS df MS F 
Complexity (C) 0.002 1 0.002 
Reading Time (R) 0.176 1 0.176 5.43 * 
Context (X) 0.062 2 0.031 
C by R 0.000 1 0.000 
c by x 0.001 2 0.0005 
R by X 0.220 2 0.110 3.38 * 
C by R by X 0.060 2 0.030 
Covariates 1.313 2 0.656 20.21 
Covariate 1 0.033 1 0.033 1.01 
Covariate 2 0.527 1 0.527 16.22 
Error 2.663 82 0.033 
*p<.05 
Covariate 1 = Total Time 
Covariate 2 = Efficiency Scores 
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proportions of the total time spent in preparation: Experiment II. 
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TABLE 19 
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE READING TIME BY CONTEXT INTERACTION 
IN THE ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE WITH PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
TIME IN PREPARATION AS VARIATE AND TOTAL TIME AND 
EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATES: EXPERIMENT II 
Source of Variance SS df MS F 
Reading Time (R) 0.176 1 0.176 5.43 * 
R at x1 0.02 1 0.02 
67 
R at x2 0.41 1 0.41 12.62 **** 
R at x3 0.00 1 0.00 
Context (X) 0.062 2 0.031 
X at R1 0.07 2 0.035 1.06 
x at R2 0.21 2 0.105 3.18 * 
Error 2.663 82 0.033 
*p<.05 
****p<.001 
x1 = Context Before 
x2 = Context After 
x3 = No Context 
Rl = One Reading 
R2 = Three Readings 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main effect of completeness of the information in the inter-
rogative probe set was found to be significant for both the total time 
and the Efficiency Score measures in Experiment I. As was pointed out 
above, subjects' initial probe choices appear to have been based not 
upon the careful consideration of the available information, but rather, 
upon the chance selection of probes prior to any verification that the 
selected probes could actually be used in the solution of the problem. 
Similar behavior has been observed by Mayer and Greeno (1975), who 
found that when presented an unsolvable problem, most subjects pro-
ceeded to carry out calculations prior to inspecting the problem 
materials to determine if a solution could be obtained. As a result 
of the suspected random nature of the initial probe selections in the 
present experiment, one can project that differences between the in-
complete and the complete conditions may have been inflated, especial-
ly for the Efficiency Score measure. Those subjects who were given 
complete information had a greater chance (from a purely stochastic 
standpoint) of initially selecting probes which could be used in the 
solution of the problem than did those subjects who were presented an 
incomplete set of interrogative probes. Furthermore, among those sub-
jects who were provided incomplete information, if an individual ts 
initial probe selections were from the permissible strategy, his sub-
sequent performance was arbitrarily better than was the performance of 
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those subjects whose initial attempt to solve the problem employed the 
strategy for which the information provided was insufficient for 
solution. Therefore, in view of this presumed randomness in the in-
itial probe selections, interpretations of the results from Experiment 
I will be made with considerable caution. 
As was expected, the main effect of wording in Experiment I is 
significant for both total time and Efficiency Scores. Due to the 
transformations and reinterpretations necessary for the comprehension 
of negative statements, those subjects who were presented interroga-
tive probes which were negatively worded required a greater number of 
probe selections and more total time in order to solve the problem 
than did those subjects who were given positive probes. 
Contextual availability was also found to be significant for both 
the total time and the Efficiency Score measures in Experiment I. 
Those subjects who were provided an appropriate context for the prob-
lem in the statement of the problem situation required less total time 
and fewer probe selections than did those subjects who were not pro-
vided a context for the problem. Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973) 
have argued that similar effects are due to the fact that a context 
aids in the interpretation and organization of prose materials such 
that they may be stored in a manner which is consistent with an in-
dividual's existing cognitive knowledge of the world. Mayer and Greeno 
(1975) similarly contend that meaningful materials facilitate the 
development of connections between the input materials and information 
already in an individual's semantic memory (i.e., external connected-
ness). If such an explanation of contextual facilitation is accurate, 
r 
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then the context by wording interaction in Experiment I should have 
been significant (hypothesis b). This predicted interaction was de-
rived from Egan and Greeno (1973) and Mayer and Greeno (1975), in 
which it was argued that once prose material has been organized and 
integrated into an individual's existing knowledge structure, the use 
of that material will be more flexible (thus rendering it more 
susceptible to transformations and modifications) than if such an 
organization and integration has not taken place. The context by 
wording interaction for neither total time nor Efficiency Scores was 
found to be significant in Experiment I. Furthermore, the main effect 
of context in.Experiment II was found to have no effect upon either of 
these measures of problem-solving efficiency. 
While these null results suggest that the explanations of con-
textual facilitation offered above may be erroneous, there are several 
plausible explanations for this lack of clear-cut evidence for con-
textual facilitation in the present study. The most obvious of these 
is that qualitative differences in the way in which information is 
processed and stored when there is a context as opposed to when there 
is not a context do not exist. In view of the large number of studies 
which have demonstrated the facilitating effects of contexts upon 
memory (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972, 1973; Doll & Lapinsky, 1974; 
Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973) and problem solving 
(Mayer & Greeno, 1975), however, such an explanation does not seem 
warranted. An alternate explanation derives from the contention that 
memory processes are not crucial to problem-solving efficiency. Again, 
however, numerous studies (e.g., Duncan, 1959; Greeno, 1973; Posner, 
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1973), as well as one's personal experiences, suggest that such an ex-
planation should not be weighted too heavily. Related to this latter 
explanation, however, is the contention that there may be many levels 
at which information may be processed. As several researchers have 
argued (e.g., Dooling, 1972; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Mistler-Lachman, 
1972; Schwartz, Sparkman, & Deese~ 1970), while at a deep level of in-
formation processing we may remember prose material with respect to a 
context, there may be a more shallow level of processing in which 
sentences are understood and remembered, but without the benefit of 
relating that information to a context. In this respect, it seems 
reasonable to suspect that the subjects in the present study may well 
have dealt with the information in the statement of the problem 
situation at this more shallow level of processing. After solving two 
practice problems which established the nature of the problem-
solving task, the majority of the subjects were likely aware of the 
type of information in the problem situation which was necessary for 
problem solution, and that information could easily be retained with-
out the aid of a context. As Bransford and his associates (e.g., 
Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971; Bransford 
& Johnson, 1972, 1973; Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973) have 
repeatedly pointed out, a subject\s performance depends not only on 
what he reads, but also on the implications of that information in view 
of the relevant knowledge he already has. In the present study, the 
relevant knowledge possessed by many subjects no doubt included the 
fact that the problem solution could be achieved simply by remembering 
the specific information about the object groupings, thus eliminating 
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any need for a deeper, context-dependent processing of the information 
in the problem situation. While no conclusion concerning this con-
jecture may be inferred from the present study, subsequent investiga-
tions of this phenomenon might include a test of recall for the problem 
situation following the problem-solving task. Through the results of 
such a recall test, an estimate of problem-solving efficiency relative 
to the degree of memory for the problem materials might be obtained. 
Subsequent investigations using the present methodology might also 
limit the number of practice problems to one, thereby reducing the 
extent to which subjects would be primed concerning the requirements 
of the task. 
The predicted (hypothesis c) paragraph complexity by reading time 
interaction in Experiment II was obtained for both the total time and 
the Efficiency Score data. However, in neither the ANACOVA whichtreated 
total time as the variate and Efficiency Score as the covariate nor in 
the ANACOVA in which total time was the covariate and Efficiency Score 
was the variate did this complexity by reading time interaction sur-
vive. These results suggest that this interaction for both total time 
and Efficiency Scores is due to the effects of the experimental 
manipulations upon the number of probe selections required for solu-
tion. When subjects were allowed only one reading of the statement 
· of the problem situation, a greater number of probes were selected when 
the statement was grannnatically and syntactically complex than when the 
statement was expressed in simple and straightforward sentences. When 
three readings of the problem situation were allowed, however, no 
differences in the number of probe selections as a function of com-
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plexity were observed. 
Kintsch and Monk (1972) obtained similar results with a solution 
accuracy measure of performance in an inferential 11problem-solving" 
task. These researchers concluded from their study that the organ-
ization and storage of information in memory is independent of the 
syntactic and grammatical complexity of the input materials, provided 
sufficient time for processing of the materials is allowed. Further-
more, these researchers suggested that since the simple and complex 
versions of each experimental paragraph had in common only semantic 
meaning, then subjects must have stored in memory representations of 
this invariant semantic meaning in the paragraphs. This interpretation 
was not to imply that each subject's cognitive representation of the 
problem materials was identical, but simply that what was stored in 
memory by a subject was the semantic meaning which was shared by each 
version of a paragraph. 
While the results of the present study are consistent with those 
obtained by Kintsch and Monk, the present findings seem to lend them-
selves better to an alternative interpretation. The availability of a 
semantic context did not influence problem-solving efficiency in 
Experiment II. Subjects (specifically those in the no context groups) 
were apparently able to solve the problem by organizing and remember-
ing only the relevant elements of the problem situation (i.e., the 
object groupings) without relating this information to an existing 
cognitive structure through the use of a semantic context. This find-
ing suggests that subjects were not processing the input materials at 
a deep, context-dependent level, a condition which Tulving (1972) has 
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suggested is necessary for the storage of semantic content (p. 389). 
If this is the case, then the significant paragraph complexity by read-
ing time interaction in Experiment II is likely not attributable to 
the storage of the invariant semantic contents of the simple and com-
plex problem situations; rather, it appears to be dependent upon the 
degree of organization of the relevant problem elements which was 
achieved by the subjects. Greeno (1972) and his associates (Egan & 
Greeno, 1973; Mayer & Greeno, 1972) contend that such an organization 
need not be based upon the semantic meaning of the problem situation; 
it may simply consist of an understanding of the interrrelationships 
of the problem elements themselves (i.e., internal connectedness). 
These researchers have found that this latter superficial level of 
connectedness is sufficient for the solution of problems which can be 
solved by means of a straightforward use of the information in the 
problem situation, but not for problems in which an interpretation of 
the problem information is required. As was mentioned earlier, by the 
time the experimental problem was presented in the present study, most 
subjects were likely aware of the requirements of the task, and there-
fore were able to solve the problem simply by organizing and remember-
ing the object groupings themselves. Such an organization and storage 
of the specific problem elements resembles the internal connectedness 
discussed by Greeno and his co-workers, which suggests that an inter-
pretational use of the problem situation was not required for problem 
solution in the present study; rather, an internal connectedness of the 
object groupings was sufficient for solution. 
In the simple version of the problem situation, the grouping of 
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the objects was expressed in a logical and straightforward manner. 
Therefore, those subjects who were presented this simple version were 
able to achieve an internal connectedness of the relevant problem 
elements with only a single reading of the problem situation. However, 
when the complex version was presented, more than a single reading was 
required for an understanding of the interrelationships of the object 
groupings. In this latter case, three readings were apparently 
sufficient for the development of this superficial structuring of the 
problem elements, but when only one reading was allowed, subjects were 
able to achieve internal connectedness only in the process of studying 
and selecting interrogative probes. As a result, these latter sub-
jects (i.e., in the complex paragraph-one reading condition) required 
more probe selections and more time in order to solve the problem than 
did the remaining subjects. 
It is possible that not only the present results, but also those 
of Kintsch and Monk, may have been due to the development of an inter-
nal connectedness of the problem elements by those subjects who were 
provided sufficient reading time. However, in view of the many 
differences between the present study and that conducted by Kintsch 
and Monk (e.g., piecemeal presentation of the problem situation vs. 
allowing the subjects to see the entire paragraph at one time; allowing 
subjects, at most, three readings of the problem situation vs. an un-
limited amount of reading time; problem solution through the use of 
information apart from that provided in the problem situation vs. an 
inferential task in which the only information provided is in the 
statement of the problem situation), a more moderate position has been 
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taken here; namely, that each interpretation is accurate for the type 
of experimental situation employed in the two studies. 
The ANACOVA in which total time was treated as the variate and 
Efficiency Score as the covariate indicated significant main effects 
for paragraph complexity and reading time. These findings indicate 
that when the total time measure of problem-solving efficiency is con-
sidered apart from the time associated with the probe selections, 
subjects required more time for problem solution when a complex problem 
situation was presented than when a simple problem situation was pro-
vided; more time was also needed when a single reading was allowed than 
when three readings were permitted. These results suggest that due to 
the complications in the problem organization resulting from the 
syntactically complex statement of the problem situation or from limited 
reading time, subjects in these conditions needed more time to under-
stand the basic organization of the problem elements than did the re-
maining subjects. 
Several studies have demonstrated the importance of preparation 
in problem solving (e.g., Buri & Slaymaker, Note 1; Johnson, 1961; 
Johnson, Lincoln, & Hall, 1961). Supplementary analyses of the data 
from Experiment II in the present study confirm these reports. The 
proportion of the total time spent in preparation was found to be 
negatively correlated with total time and with the Efficiency Scores, 
accounting for 29% and 38% of the variance, respectively. As indicated 
by the nonsignificant correlation between the proportion of the total 
time spent in preparation and the total time residuals of the regression 
of total time on the Efficiency Scores, each of these highly signifi-
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cant negative correlations is due to the inverse relationship of the 
proportions of the total time spent in preparation to the number of 
probe selections required for solution. As the proportion of the total 
time in preparation increased, the number of probe selections needed 
for solution decreased. 
Johnson et al. (1961) have offered a description of problem-
solving behavior during preparation which may aid in the interpreta-
tion of these findings. They found that subjects spent much of their 
time during the preparatory period organizing a prospective solution 
strategy. Once that strategy was sufficiently organized by a subject, 
he pr~ceeded to search for a behavior which would match his selected 
strategy and result in problem solution. In the present study, those 
subjects who were provided sufficient time to process the input 
materials were able to organize the information in the problem situa-
tion well enough that they could construct a solution strategy (or a 
partial solution strategy) during the preparatory period. The sub-
sequent attempts by these subjects to implement the selected strategies 
in the solution of the problem generally met with success, as indicated 
by the overall lower Efficiency Scores for these subjects. When 
insufficient processing time was allowed, however, subjects did not 
have the problem elements organized well enough prior to the prepara-
tory period that they were able to construct a prospective strategy 
during that time. As a result, many of these subjects made probe 
selections prior to formulating a strategy, apparently in an effort to 
obtain information which would enable them to organize the problem 
materials and subsequently solve the problem. The success of such an 
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approach in which a problem solution is attempted prior to the formula-
tion of a tentative strategy is evidenced by the relatively greater 
number of probe selections required by these subjects for problem 
solution. 
A significant reading time by context interaction was obtained in 
the ANACOVA in which the proportion of the total time spent in prepara-
tion was treated as the variate and total time and Efficiency Scores 
were treated as covariates. This finding indicates that when the 
effects of total time and Efficiency Scores are eliminated from the 
analyses, a greater proportion of the total time was spent in prepara-
tion when the context was provided after three readings of the 
problem situation than in any other condition. Apparently, while 
reading the statement of the problem situation, subjects attempted to 
organize the problem elements. This basic organization was developed 
and subsequently employed in the solution of the problem, provided 
information presented later did not disrupt it. When the context was 
presented prior to the statement of the problem situation or when the 
context was not provided, no new information was presented which would 
require the subjects to reorganize the problem elements. When the 
context was presented after the reading of the problem situation, 
however, subjects who had been able to construct a sufficient organiza-
tion of the problem elements while reading the problem situation found 
that what they had organized could be better understood within the 
context of washing clothes. These subjects (i.e., allowed three 
readings) then took time prior to any probe selections to structure 
the problem elements consistent with the given context. Those sub-
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jects who were only allowed a single reading of the problem situation, 
however, apparently were not able to construct an organization of the 
problem elements during the reading time which was strong enough that 
subsequent information would have a disruptive effect upon it. This is 
consistent with the conclusion offered above that subjects who were 
provided only a single reading required more time subsequent to that 
reading in order to gain an understanding of the basic organization of 
the problem elements. Only after this basic organization was under-
stood could subjects proceed to develop a deeper understanding of the 
interrelationships of the problem elements and to devise a workable 
solution strategy. 
SUMMARY 
Two experiments were .conducted to replicate and extend the 
findings of previous research on the availability of contextual infor-
mation in prose materials. The problem was introduced with a consid-
eration of the nature of contextual availability and its effect upon 
memory, and the role of memory in problem solving was then discussed. 
Tentative support for the facilitative effects of contextual avail-
ability were obtained in Experiment I, but the contextual manipulations 
in Experiment II were found to have no effect upon problem-solving 
performance. It is suggested that this lack of clear-cut evidence 
for contextual facilitation is the result of a superficial level of 
processing of the problem materials, which resulted from experimental 
conditions which primed subjects as to the requirements of the task. 
In Experiment II, total time to problem solution and the number of 
items of information needed for solution were affected by paragraph 
complexity when insufficient processing time was allowed. No such 
differences were obtained, however, when subjects were given sufficient 
reading time. The argument is advanced that contrary to the interpre-
tations of similar results offered in previous studies, these findings 
are not the result of the storage of the semantic content of the input 
materials. 
The importance of preparation in the problem-solving process 
was also observed. As the proportion of the total time spent in pre-
paration increased, problem-solving performance improved. These findings 
indicate that the more time a subject spends formulating a solution 
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strategy prior to an attempt to actively solve the problem, the better 
will be his performance. 
REFERENCE NOTES 
1. Buri, J. R. & Slaymaker, F. L. Preparation in problem solving: 
The longer you look, the better you leap. Paper presented at the 
Forty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Psychological 
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Below are the instructions, as they were tape recorded and pre-
sented to each subject. The instructions were also typed on a separ-
ate sheet of paper, thus allowing the subjects to read them as they 
were being presented on the tape recorder. 
"This is an experiment to see how well you can solve problems. 
You will be asked to solve several problems, one at a time. 
"For each problem you will be given several sentences to read. 
These sentences describe a problem situation upon which the problem 
is based. Each of these sentences is typed on a seperate index 
card. You will be allowed to read and study each sentence for seven 
seconds. After you have read all of the sentences, the deck of index 
cards on which the sentences are typed will be taken from you. 
"At that time you will be given a problem display board like the 
one that you see in front of you. At the top of this display board 
is typed the problem that I would like you to solve. This problem is 
based upon the sentences that were presented on the deck of index 
cards. 
"On the display board, just below the statement of the problem 
is a series of narrow openings. Each of these openings has a question 
in it. Among the questions in these openings are several of the 
questions that a person might choose to ask in order to figure out the 
solution to the problem. 
"Your task is to solve the problem which is presented at the top 
of the display board. The problem can be solved by obtaining answers 
the questions on the display board. The answer to a question can be 
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obtained by pulling the cardboard strip on which the question is 
typed approximately ~ inch to the right until the answer appears in 
the small square window next to the question. 
"In solving the problem, you are free to choose which questions 
you want answered, obtaining the answers to those questions which you 
choose by pulling the cardboard strips on which those questions are 
typed approximately ~ inch to the right until the answers appear in 
the windows. Remember: You are free to choose any questions on the 
display board that you want answered, but work as carefully and as 
quickly as you can. 
"To review the instructions briefly: First, I will give you a 
deck of index cards. There is one sentence typed on each card, and 
you will have seven seconds to read each sentence. The way that you 
will know when seven seconds is up is that I have beeps tape 
recorded at seven second intervals. When you hear the first beep, 
proceed to the first sentence in the deck of index cards and read it 
carefully. Continue studying that sentence until you hear another 
beep, at which time you should go to the next card in the deck and 
read the sentence on that card. Continue in this way until you have 
read each sentence in the deck of index cards. 
"At that time, I will give you a problem display board. The 
problem that I would like you to solve is stated at the top of the 
display board, and it is based upon the information contained in the 
deck of index cards. The way that you are to solve the problem is 
by getting answers to some of the questions on the display board. 
You will find that you will need some of the answers, but not 
necessarily all of them, in order to solve the problem. In the end, 
you will have to add, or subtract, certain numbers in order to 
figure out what the exact solution is. Once you figure out the 
h • • II solution, tell me w at it is. 
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